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NOTES
UNDIGNIFIED IN DEFEAT: AN ANALYSIS OF

THE STAGNATION AND DEMISE OF
PROPOSED LEGISLATION LIMITING VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION

What do the phrases "reality television" and "workplace privacy,"
have in common? Both phrases, in large part due to improvements in
technology, are misnomers. While most savvy reality show viewers
realize that their favorite shows are cast, contrived and edited, thereby
taking the "reality" out of reality television, many employees continue to
rely upon a false notion that they possess an inherent and basic human
right to privacy and that this right follows them to work each day. So,
while reality show participants elect to expose themselves to the tireless
eyes of electronic cameras, many employees may be unaware that
hidden cameras are recording their every move.
Video surveillance is becoming increasingly widespread in the
workplace. According to a 2005 survey by the American Management
Association, a growing percentage of the 526 employers participating
reported that they regularly monitor the conduct of their employees.
Furthermore, while the sophistication of surveillance equipment is
increasing, the cost is falling precipitously. "A decent closed-circuit TV
(video surveillance) equipment [sic] costs less than $3,000, and the
cameras, using fiber-optic technology, can acquire a good image from a

1. Am. Mgmt. Ass'n & Nancy Flynn, The ePolicy Inst., 2005 Electronic Monitoring &
2005,
18,
May
ASS'N,
MGM'T
AM.
Survey,
Surveillance
https://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS-summary05.pdf. "23% [of the participating entities]
represent companies employing 100 or fewer workers, 101-500 employees (25%), 501-1,000
(10%), 1,001-2,500 (13%), 2,501-5,000 (7%) and 5,001 or more (22%)." Id.
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hole the size of a pencil point.",2 A range of technology including hidden
cameras, recording devices, and
tiny wireless cameras, is available for
3
dollars.
hundred
five
than
less
A thin line exists between surveillance and voyeurism. Gail Nelson,
an employee of Salem State College in Massachusetts, had to apply
prescription ointment to her severe sunburn during the summer of 1995.4
At times when she was not expecting clients or visitors, she went to the
back of the office, behind partitions, and unbuttoned her blouse to apply
the prescribed ointment to her chest and neck.5 Gail also changed her
clothes numerous times that summer behind the same partitions before
or after business hours when the office was empty and the front door
was locked. 6
During that same time period, the college learned about possible
unauthorized access to the office. 7 For security reasons, the college
installed hidden surveillance cameras that were set up in the same area
where Gail applied her ointment and changed.8 She eventually learned
of the surveillance and sued the college. 9 The court, however, granted
the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, ending the suit.10
The indignity Gail suffered is not an isolated event. In Lafayette,
Louisiana, the Wal-Mart Store installed a video camera in the employee
unisex bathroom to catch a suspected thief. 11 Theft and unauthorized
conduct by employees led to the installation of a video camera in the
employee locker room at Johnson County Community College.1 2 Most
recently, workers at a Kentucky distribution center discovered a video

2. Parry Aftab, The Privacy Lawyer: To Videotape Or Not To Videotape,
INFORMATIONWEEK,
Aug.
16,
2004,
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticleSrc.jhtml?articlelD=26806697.
3. See, e.g., Wireless Security Cameras, http://www.surveillance-spy-cameras.com (follow
links for digital surveillance, wireless hidden cameras, and armor dome cameras) (last visited Mar.
27, 2008).
4. Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Mass. 2006).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 344, 347.
7. Id. at 343.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 344.
10. Id. at 342.
11. Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 544, 546 (La. Ct. App. 1997). The
installation of the camera was not completed before it was discovered. Id. Wal-Mart Management
alleged that in its review of all the surveillance tapes in its possession, none showed any recordings
of the bathroom. Id. at 547.
12. Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 503-04 (D. Kan. 1996).
The locker room was used primarily for storage, however, employees often changed their clothes as
well. Id.
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3
camera installed in the men's bathroom.'
Employers use surveillance to monitor productivity, and to protect
property and workers' safety.' 4 However, the unchecked use of video
surveillance is leading to invasive forms of surveillance, such as direct
surveillance, even outside the workplace.' 5 This note explores the
existing statutory and common law protections workers have against
workplace video surveillance. There are few protections available. In
public workplaces, the Fourth Amendment is relied upon, but proves
insufficient. Private causes of action include invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, but both are difficult to prove
and depend on state common and statutory law. Labor unions have
statutory protections that non-union workers do not have, but these
protections have been limited as well.
There is great disparity amongst applicable laws in various states,
public versus private workplaces, and union as opposed to non-union
workplaces. Several states, including New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey have enacted statutes to specifically address workplace privacy
concerns, 16 however, the scope of these laws is inconsistent and, in many
states, inadequate.
Certainly, video surveillance is useful and in some circumstances
even necessary. Employers have a right to protect their business interests
and property, 7 but this reasoning must not be used as pretext to monitor

13. Barbo v. The Kroger Co., No. 3:07-CV-14-S, 2007 WL 2350179, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
13, 2007) (suing the manager); Barbo v. The Kroger Co., 3:07-CV-14-S, 2007 WL 2350183, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2007) (suing the employer-company).
14. See Hanah Cho, Think Before You Surf at Work: Employee Monitoring of Internet, Email, Phone Use Becomes More Intrusive, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/careers/bal-cho0925,0,4984114.column?coll=bal-careersutility.
15. See Michael Barbaro, Bare-Knuckle Enforcement for Wal-Mart's Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2007, at Al. Wal-Mart has hired a team of investigators, including former FBI agents. Id.
These investigators have conducted investigations into sexual relations between employees outside
the workplace, monitored phone conversations, and even intimidated workers who question
authority. See id.
16. N.Y. LAB. Law. § 203-c (McKinney Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48b
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to :156A-34 (West Supp. 2007).
17. Video surveillance has also proven useful for employers to protect themselves against
discrimination and sexual harassment claims. See Kumar v. United Health & Hosp. Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:04-CV-2782, 2007 WL 200958, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2007); Napreljac v. John Q.
Hammons Hotels, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 981, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2006), affd, 505 F.3d 800 (8th Cir.
2007). By recording the allegedly discriminatory or harassing actions, the employer can use the
tape as evidence at trial. See Kumar, 2007 WL 200958, at *2; Napreljac, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
However, sexual harassment is emerging as another cause of action to combat video surveillance.
E.g. EEOC v. Smokin' Joe's Tobacco Shop, No. 06-01758, 2007 WL 1258132, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 27, 2007).
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at will. This note will analyze past proposals considered by Congress
and discuss their individual and collective weaknesses. Most proposals
introduced in Congress have been incomplete. Those proposals focused
on prohibiting cameras from only the most intrusive areas of the
workplace, such as restrooms. While restrooms are undoubtedly private
areas, where cameras should not be installed, this limited prohibition
does not address the larger concerns about the maintenance of workers'
individual and collective dignity.' 8
The note will conclude with a new, comprehensive legislative
proposal that addresses these weaknesses. The revamped legislation
would include notice requirements (as to when and how employees will
be monitored), provide for monitor free areas (such as break rooms and
locker rooms), ensure compliance by imposing civil penalties for minor
violations (such as failure to give notice), and criminal prosecution for
major infractions (such as monitoring a statutorily prohibited area).
"[Video] surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral
reaction: indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the
Orwellian state."' 9 Due to video surveillance's extremely invasive
nature and the disparity between state and local laws, Americans need
federal legislation designed to protect the privacy and dignity of the
workforce.
A. Privacy v. Dignity
American jurisprudence has relied on the concept of privacy to
battle workplace surveillance.2 ° Black's Law Dictionary defines privacy
as "[t]he condition or state of being free from public attention to
intrusion into or interference with one's acts or decisions."'" Privacy in
American law has been treated similarly to property rights 22 and
therefore the protections associated with it have been limited.23

18. See discussion infra Parts I.A.
19. The court was specifically addressing police video surveillance, however, their
characterization of video surveillance in general is applicable to the workplace. U.S. v. CuevasSanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987); see generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 3-4 (Hacourt
Brace Jovanovich 1949) (describing a world where privacy no longer exists and the government has
the ability to monitor everything, including a person's thoughts).
20. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987); Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110
F.3d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1997).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
23. See Lawrence R. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: ElectronicMonitoring in the Workplace,
19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 382-83 (2000).
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The concept of dignity may prove to be a more appropriate
framework for understanding the issues presented by electronic
workplace surveillance, providing employees with stronger protections.
Black's definition of dignity is consistent with how American law has
dealt with the topic. Legally, dignity is defined simply as "the state of
being noble. 24 American law does not consider the concept as having
any legal influence. Webster's Dictionary defines dignity as "the quality
of being worthy of esteem or honor" and "a high position, rank, or
title."25 At the heart of the idea, dignity
is a social concept that
"promotes a humane and civilized life."'26
The concept of dignity is widespread in continental Europe.2 7 As
opposed to property, it is rooted in the conceptions of community and
citizenship.28 For instance, workers in France are considered part of an
"enterprise community. '29 The workplace is a forum for fostering social
relationships as well as for personal goals such as self-fulfillment and
self-discovery.3 ° Work is performed not only for economic purposes,
but also to fulfill basic human needs. 31 By reducing the employee to
nothing more than a means for production, an employer violates the
employee's dignity.32
Previously proposed and enacted legislation shows that U.S.
lawmakers have taken a truly American view of the problem of
workplace surveillance.3 3
The result is that limitations on video
surveillance do not go beyond particularly private areas, such as locker
rooms, changing rooms, and bathrooms.3 4 Only by embracing the
European idea of dignity can one truly understand the need for further
regulation to regain respect for each other as humans instead of, simply,
as bodies.

24.
25.
2001).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (8th ed. 2004).
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 403 (IDG Books Worldwide, Inc. 4th ed.

26. Rothstein, supra note 23, at 383.
27.

Id.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Compare discussion infra Part IV with discussion infra Part V.
Rothstein, supra note 23, at 382-83.
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B. Privacy ProtectionLegislation: An Economic Rationale
Americans spend a considerable amount of time at work. Twentyeight percent of Americans work more than forty hours per week and
eight percent work more than sixty hours per week. 35 "An average
American gets 14 days of vacation [per year] but takes only 11."3 This
means that many workers involuntarily subject themselves to more than
two thousand hours of video camera surveillance per year.
"Electronic monitoring acts as an electronic whip that drives the
fast pace of today's workplace in the growing service industry. 37 The
unregulated use of electronic monitoring is turning modem offices into
"electronic sweatshops. 3 8 Because of the repetitive nature of office
duties and the importance of attention to detail in performing these
duties, relentless monitoring places great stress on employees. 39 In
1993, the estimated cost of workplace stress in the United States was
fifty billion dollars.40
General notice of monitoring practices is not a complete solution.
The standard form of notice only advises employees that the company
"reserves the right to monitor anything at any time., 41 Without
notification of the specific types of monitoring, employees do not know
if their computers or phone conversations are being monitored, or if
video surveillance is used.42 They do not know if the monitoring is
continuous or random, or even whether management is actually
monitoring them at all.43

This uncertainty adds to workplace stress and violates a person's
sense of dignity. An Australian Privacy Commissioner's study
concluded that video surveillance substantially impacts the work
environment.4 4 Video surveillance has the effect of undermining morale

35.

Chris Gaylord, Office Hours: Unions, Wages, White Shirts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,

Sept. 5, 2006, at 20.
36.

Paul B. Brown, All Tapped Out, or Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2007, at C5.

37. 139 CONG. REC. 10,354, 10,355 (1993) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The estimate is a measure of health care and lost productivity. Id.
41. NAT'L WORKRIGHTS INST., PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN THE
at
2004),
available
4
(Dec.
WORKPLACE
http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWIEMReport.pdf.

42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. TIM DIXON, THE PRIVACY COMM. OF NEW S. WALES, No. 67, INVISIBLE EYES: REPORT
ON VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE § 3.4 (Aug. 1995), available at

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/CyberLRes/1995/video/index.html.
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and creating distrust and suspicion between employees and
management.45 One respondent to the study noted, "I also think that
employees have a right to work relatively comfortably in their work
environment, unselfconsciously, and I think this is impossible when you
know that every movement is being recorded by a camera.' 46
Privacy is a vexing issue for legislators and surveillance is a
double-edged sword. The fact that opponents of workplace surveillance
typically rely upon non-economic arguments might partially explain why
mainstream economics, so far, has been surprisingly silent on this
important issue. Generally speaking, critics of electronic monitoring
laws emphasize teleological arguments (non-moral results based almost
solely on productivity) to support their ideas, whereas proponents of
privacy protection laws generally favor deontological arguments,
stressing ethical concerns such as humility, dignity, and respect.47
Employers generally believe that they should be able to engage in
48
monitoring in order to increase productivity as well as to reduce costs.
Furthermore, they claim that technological surveillance is only
implemented when the result is an increase in the total surplus generated
in the workplace.4 9 Otherwise, the employer would have a disincentive
to monitor because it would not be in the employer's best interest to do
so.
Numerous studies, however, demonstrate that increased monitoring
often contributes to an atmosphere of distrust amongst employees, which
is certainly not conducive to high levels of productivity. 50 Employees
who have their performance monitored incur health problems due to
stress and high levels of tension. 5 However, scholars have offered an
additional argument that laws restricting workplace surveillance are
desirable even if the surveillance does not harm the individual
employees. 52 In essence, this takes those same teleological arguments
employed by critics of privacy protection and uses them in favor of
legislation.
For example, take as given the fact that an employer is only
45.
46.

Id.
Id.

47.

G. Stoney Alder, Ethical Issues in Electronic Performance Monitoring: A Consideration

of Deontologicaland TeleologicalPerspectives, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 729, 730-32, 736 (1998).
48. Id. at 731 (citations omitted).
49. Patrick W. Schmitz, Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection and Efficiency Wages,
12 LAB. ECON. 727, 728 (2005).

50. Alder, supra note 47, at 733-34 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 735.
52. Schmitz, supra note 49, at 729.
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interested in maximizing profits and that an employer who wants his or
her employees to work hard must provide incentives to those
employees.53 Economists of efficiency wage literature commonly refer
to this incentive as "rent.''54 So, in other words, the employer must pay
the "wealth-constrained" employee a positive rent in order to provide an
incentive for exerting effort that is otherwise unobservable. 55 The
alternative, employers argue, is to make the effort observable by
implementing video surveillance.56 The theory is that an employer will
not have to provide as much rent as an incentive to work hard if the
57
effort is directly observable and can be measured by the employer.
However, surveillance has costs of its own. Laws preventing video
58
surveillance can actually increase the total workplace surplus.
Although such laws will decrease employer's surplus, this loss can be
offset and surpassed by the gain to the employees. 59 After all, the
employer invests in surveillance equipment not only to achieve higher
rates of effort from employees, but also to reduce the amount of rent that
employers must pay those employees to exert effort. 60 Employer profit
is equal to total surplus minus the employees' rent. 6t Therefore, if the
reduction of the employee's rent due to monitoring is sufficiently large,
then the employer will incur monitoring costs even if they are larger than
the additional surplus generated by higher effort. 62 The employer will be
wasting resources in order to redistribute wealth.63 Therefore, if
surveillance laws were implemented, this could decrease the amount of
rent that the employer would have 64to pay the employee and could
increase the two parties' total surplus.
This theory assumes that the employee does not directly suffer from
the loss of his or her privacy. It, therefore, attempts to make surveillance
more desirable than it actually is. Even given this advantage, it can be
argued that laws restricting surveillance produce the most efficient
outcomes for society.

53.

Id.

54.

See id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 732.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 729.
62. Id. at 732.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

A. A ConstitutionalRight to Privacy?
The federal right to privacy has been established as an avenue for
public employees only, leaving private employees to rely on other
causes of action.65 Constitutional privacy rights have only been
established via case law. There are no explicit privacy guarantees in the
Constitution.6 6 These rights, as developed by the Supreme Court
through precedent, are grossly inadequate.
Griswold v. Connecticut 7 is the first United States Supreme Court
case to hold that the Constitution provides a right of privacy. 68 Though
privacy is not an enumerated right, the Court infers it from several parts
of the Constitution, as well as from previous decisions.69 In the past, the
Court upheld the right of people to associate, the right of a parent to
choose a child's education, and the right to study what one chooses, even
though these rights are not explicit.7 0 Justice Douglas stated that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.,

71

The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment

guarantees each create "zones of privacy. 72
The Supreme Court further linked the Fourth Amendment to the
notion of privacy in Katz v. United States.73 In Katz, the petitioner
violated federal law by using a public telephone to transmit wagering
information interstate.74 The FBI used audio surveillance on the phone
booth to catch the petitioner in the act by attaching a listening device to

65. The Fourth Amendment is limited to government actors. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921). The Fourteenth Amendment has made the Fourth Amendment applicable to state
actors. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). However, some state constitutions, such as
California, extend privacy protection to individuals against private actors. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d
633, 644 (Cal. 1994).
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (acknowledging that the right of
privacy "is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution").
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. Id. at 485 (holding there is a marital right of privacy protected by the constitution).
69. See id. at 481-86.
70. Id. at 482-83.
71. Id. at 484.
72. Id. at 484-85.
73. 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
74. Id. at 348.
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the outside of the booth.75 The Court rejected the "trespass doctrine 76
and held the petitioner justifiably relied on privacy by entering the booth
and closing the door.77 The government violated privacy within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment by monitoring the petitioner's
conversation, despite the
fact that the listening device did not "penetrate
78
the wall of the booth.,
In 1987, the Supreme Court directly addressed workplace privacy
in O'Connor v. Ortega.79 The O'Connorplaintiff was a doctor placed
on administrative leave during an investigation of charges against him.8"
While on leave, the hospital entered the plaintiff-doctor's office to
inventory property. 81 The administration took several personal items
from his desk including a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a
book of poetry. 82 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply
to
83
enforcement.
law
just
not
supervisors,
and
government employers
The O'Connor decision extended Fourth Amendment protection to
employees' private property regardless of whether they are suspected of
criminal activity.8 4 Furthermore, the decision provided that just because
an employee works for the government instead of a private employer
does not mean that he or she loses Fourth Amendment rights.85 An
employee's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the employer
infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy.86 In determining a
reasonable expectation, a court may look to the framers' intention, an
individual's use of a particular location, and whether "certain 87
areas
deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.
The Court held that the reasonableness standard must be decided on
a case-by-case basis. 88 Courts must balance the worker's Fourth

75. Id.
76. The trespass doctrine requires a "technical trespass ... under local property law" before
Fourth Amendment protections are violated. Id. at 353 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505,510-11 (1961)).
77. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
78. Id.
79. 480 U.S. 709, 714-19 (1987).
80. Id. at 713.
81. Id. at 712-13.
82. Id. at 713.
83. Id. at 714, 717-18.
84. ld. at 715.
85. Id. at 717.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 715 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
88. Id. at 717-18.
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Amendment interests against the importance of the government's
While some employees may have a reasonable expectation
intrusion.
of privacy in their office or desks, that expectation may be reduced by
office practices or procedures and must be assessed in the "context of the
Coworkers, supervisors, or the public
employment relation." 90
continually enter some offices. 9' Notably, the Court states that some
offices may be open to the extent that they completely eliminate any
expectation of privacy.92
B. The Fourth Amendment's Application to Public Workplace Video
Surveillance
In a Fourth Amendment claim against a public employer for an
unreasonable search by means of video surveillance,9 3 an employee must
prove there was a subjective and objective reasonable expectation of
privacy.94 In most cases, courts have assumed that the plaintiff had a
subjective expectation of privacy and have therefore focused their
analysis on whether there was an objective expectation. 95 There is no
bright line rule to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists; courts instead look to the guidelines established by O'Connor in
making their determination.9 6
The reasonableness standard, as developed, is so narrow that few
employees will be protected from video surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment. The mere possibility that an unexpected person may enter
the area may be enough to defeat an expectation of privacy. Gail
Nelson's story is a clear example.9 7 Ms. Nelson hid behind an office
partition while changing and applying lotion to intimate areas, but, it

89. Id. at 719 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
90. Id. at 717.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 718. The Court held that the plaintiff-doctor did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and desk because they were not shared with other employees and the employer
did not discourage employees from keeping personal items in the workplace. Id. at 718-19.
93. Video surveillance has been held to be a Fourth Amendment search. See United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1984).
94. Vega-Rodiguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., l10 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997); Sacramento County
Deputy Sheriffs' Assoc. v. County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338, 346 (Mass. 2006) (citing Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at
178).
95. E.g., Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 178; Nelson, 845 N.E.2d at 346.
96. See discussion supra Part II.A.
97. See discussion supra Part I.
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was reasoned, because the area was not completely closed off from the
rest of the office and it was possible for other employees or clients to
walk past the area, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. 98 It did not matter that she conducted herself discreetly or that
many times she applied her medication after hours, while the doors were
locked.99 The court held the entire office was an "open work area" and
despite her subjective belief of privacy, society could not consider such
an area to be private. 100
In Thompson v. Johnson County Community College,'0' the
10 2
plaintiffs were security officers employed by a community college.
The employees had access to a locker room where they kept their
belongings and changed clothes.'0 3 The college installed a video
surveillance camera in the locker room.' 0 4 The security officers did not
exclusively use the locker room;' 0 5 it was also a storage area and
contained the air conditioning equipment. 10 6 Access was not restricted
and maintenance workers and other individuals could enter the room at
will to retrieve items from storage.' 0 7 After considering these factors,
that the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation
the court ruled
08
of privacy.'
The court reached the same result in Brannen,0 9 when school
custodians sued their employer, the school district, for covert video
surveillance of the break room." 0 Applying the O'Connor standards,
the court held the custodians did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy because the room was open to all school employees."' The
it contained
court characterized the room as an all purpose room because
2
supplies."
cleaning
and
machine,
washing
a microwave,

98. Nelson, 845 N.E.2d at 347.
99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
1997 WL
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
I11.
112.

Id.
No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 139760 (10th Cir. March 25, 1997).
Id. at *1.
Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1996), aff d,
139670 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 504.
Thompson, 1997 WL 139760, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at*2.
Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 91-92.
Id.
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C. The Fourth Amendment Failsto Adequately Protectthe Workforce's
Dignity
Nelson, Thompson, and Brannen are examples of how the Fourth
Amendment fails to provide adequate protections against invasive video
monitoring of employees. In Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co.," 3 the
court recognized both the invasiveness 4 of surveillance and the
constitution's failure to provide protection.'1
The Vega-Rodriguez plaintiffs were employees of the Puerto Rico
Their job was to monitor the
Telephone Company ("PRTC")." 5
6
The plaintiffs worked in the
company's computers for alarms."
penthouse of an office complex where access was restricted and entry
The workspace was "open" in that
required an access card." 7
employees worked in one large area and did not have separate offices or
cubicles." 8 PRTC installed three video cameras that surveyed the work
area and another one to monitor the main entrance." 9 With the
employees' knowledge, the cameras operated "all20 day, everyday," and
recorded "every act undertaken in the work area."'1
The plaintiffs argued that management is expected to watch their
employees; however, video surveillance is unremitting and, "unlike the
The "unrelenting eyes" of a
human eye [a camera] never blinks.''
camera prohibit a worker from yawning, scratching, or making any
movement in privacy.' 22 The court rejected this as a Fourth Amendment
argument. 123 In constitutional terms, relying on the Fourth Amendment,
the plaintiffs asked the court to prohibit management from doing
124
electronically that which it could legally accomplish with human eyes.
The court concluded that an individual could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that which is displayed openly. 25 Because of

113.
114.
115.
178.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

l10F.3d 174(lstCir. 1997).
Seeid. at 178.
Id.at 176. PRTC is a quasi-public company thus the fourth amendment applies. Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

176.
176.

180.
181.
182.
180.

125. Id. at 181. This rule is known as the plain view doctrine. Id. at 180. The court cautions
that its holding might be different if the surveillance were covert. Id. at 180-81.
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the open nature of the workplace, the court concluded plaintiffs had no
expectation of privacy. 126 "[T]he mere fact that the observation is
accomplished by a video camera rather than the naked eye, and recorded
on film rather than in a supervisor's memory, does not transmogrify a
constitutionally innocent act into a constitutionally forbidden one.' ' 7
The Constitution sees no difference between an electronic video
camera and a human eye and this is where a fundamental flaw exists in
American law. As the Vega-Rodriguez plaintiffs point out, there is a
practical difference between a human eye and video camera.128 A video
camera is unrelenting for every minute of every day. 129 Employees
would not expect a supervisor to stand above their desks every second of
the day and watch every movement made. A supervisor is also unable to
recall an exact moment in time from memory like videotape and to
display that memory so that others can see the images in the same way
they were perceived. In direct contrast, a recorded video image can exist
forever and can be shared with others.
The humiliation exemplified in Nelson, the intrusiveness in
Thompson, and the disrespect in Vega-Rodriguez, identifies many of the
problems created by unregulated video surveillance. Furthermore, these
cases illustrate the need for Congress to enact rules regulating workplace
video surveillance. American workers cannot rely solely on the
Constitution's elusive right to privacy.
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY HISTORY

A. The Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986130 ("ECPA"),
also referred to as the Federal Wiretapping Act, prohibits the intentional
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications
(including those which occur in the workplace).' 3 1 Violators of the Act

126. Id. at 180.
127. Id. at 181.
128. See id. at 180.
129. See id. at 181; cf ORWELL, supra note 20, at 28 ("Always the eye watching you ....
Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed-no escape.
Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull.").
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
131. Id.§2511.
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132
are subject to civil liability, including punitive damages.
The Act protects workplace phone calls, e-mail and Internet access,
however, it contains loopholes for employers. Most notably, the Act has
been interpreted as completely inapplicable to video-only
surveillance.133 Therefore, installation of a video-only surveillance
system in a security personnel dressing and changing room did not
violate the Act because the statute does not prohibit silent video
recordings. 134 As a result, statutory violations of video surveillance arise
only if microphones are used in conjunction with the video cameras,
resulting in audio-visual surveillance. 135 Therefore, employers can
circumvent the statute by simply eliminating the audio component while
continuing to record employees' actions.
The Federal Wiretapping Act of 1986 set important privacy
standards for technologies that were emerging in the 1980's.
Unfortunately, opportunities for surveillance in the workplace have
expanded tremendously in the last two decades and privacy law has not

kept pace. 136

B. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004
Congress has also enacted the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of
2004131 ("VVPA"). It is general in coverage and does not apply only to
the workplace.1 38 The Act prohibits intentional capturing 139 of an image

of an individual's "private area"''

40

when the actor knows the individual

132. Id. §§ 2511(4), (5), 2520(b).
133. See U.S. v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We ...now hold that silent
video surveillance is neither prohibited nor regulated by [the Act]."); Audenreid v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (installing a video camera that did not record
sounds in the manager's office did not violate federal or Pennsylvania wiretapping laws).
134. See Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D. Kan. 1996),
affd, No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 139670 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 1997).
135. Thompson, 930 F. Supp. at 505.
136. See David N. King, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace: Protectionfrom
Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging "Privacy Gap," 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 468 (1994);
Sandra Byrd Petersen, Your Life as an Open Book: Has Technology Rendered PersonalPrivacy
Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED COMM. L.J. 163, 164 (1995); Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the
Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271,
272 (1996).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
138. See id. The statute applies to anyone within the "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
139. Id. § 1801 (b)(l) (capture means to videotape, photograph, or film).
140. Id. § 1801(b)(3)-(4) (private areas are the "naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic
area, buttocks, or female breast").
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has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 141 An individual has a
reasonable privacy expectation when the person believes he or she can
disrobe without concern that images are being captured of private
areas 142143or when the person believes the private areas are not visible to
public.
The Act is an affirmative recognition of advanced technology's
increasing ability to invade privacy.1 44 The statute is intended to
prohibit "video voyeurism," as opposed to general video surveillance,
that may have a legitimate purpose, yet is still intrusive. 145 The Act's
weakness in the workplace is the reasonableness standard. Gail Nelson
would likely still be unsuccessful had she been able to rely on the
VVPA. 146 Though the reasonableness standard in the VVPA appears
more subjective, the standard has failed employees time and again and it
is a poor standard for the workplace. It relies solely on privacy and
neglects to protect dignity.
C. NLRA: Labor Unions are Afforded Some FederalProtection and
Demonstrate the Importance of Remedies
The National Labor Relations Act protects employees who engage
in "protected activities. 1 47 Courts have generally held that video
surveillance tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
exercising protected activities. 148 Recent National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") cases have established that employers must provide
notice to labor unions before installing surveillance cameras. 149 The
141. Id. § 1801(a).
142. Id. § 1801(b)(5)(A).
143. Id. § 1801(b)(5)(B). Whether the individual is in a public or private place does not matter
in the determination. Id.
144. See H.R. REP. No. 108-504, at 2-3 (2004) (discussing advances in miniaturization
technology of cameras and ability to broadcast images across media such as the internet).
145. See id. Congress intended to protect "unsuspecting adults, high school students and
children[,]" noting that video voyeurism has occurred in "high school locker rooms, department
store dressing rooms, and even homes." Id. Congress further discussed the prevalence of
voyeurism in public places, but limited its discussion to the highly intrusive methods of"upskirting"
and "downblousing." Id. at 3.
146. There have not been any decisions interpreting the statute as it applies to the workplace.
147. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
148. See NLRB v. Assoc. Naval Architects, Inc. 355 F.2d 788, 791 (4th Cir. 1966) (it was "the
act of photographing itself that had the tendency in these circumstances to intimidate"); NLRB v.
Frick Co., 397 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1968) (violated 8(a)(l) partly by talking photographs of the
strikers); Sunbelt Mfg., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 780, 789 (1992) (citing Certainteed Corp., 282 N.L.R.B.
1101, 1114 (1987)) (finding the video taping activities of the company to violate 8(a)(l)).
149. See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 (1997) (requiring an employer to
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employer must provide the opportunity to negotiate and bargain over
their implementation. 150 Therefore, video surveillance is a "mandatory
subject of [collective] bargaining," 15' and a union has the right to
bargain over the installation and use of video surveillance cameras.152
In Colgate-Palmolive,'53 a 1997 decision, the employer used
monitoring to prevent theft and misconduct. 154 Employees caught
engaging in such activities were to be disciplined and possibly
discharged.155 The Board compared the use of video surveillance to
physical examinations, drug and alcohol testing, and polygraph testing,
all of which are "mandatory subjects of bargaining."'' 56 The Board
reasoned that video surveillance was related to the "work environment"
and "[was] not a managerial decision that lies at the core of
entrepreneurial control."' 157
The installation of cameras was not
"fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise" and it also
impinged "directly on employment security."' 5 8 In a subsequent 2003
decision, the Seventh Circuit agreed. 5 9
In the most recent decision, Anheuser-Busch, 60 the NLRB would
not rescind the discipline of employees even though the employer had
illegally and secretly installed hidden cameras.' 61 The Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") found that installation of hidden cameras, which
monitor work areas, requires notice and the opportunity for
bargaining. 162 Furthermore, the area in dispute could indeed be called a
"work area," thus broadening the definition. 163
However, surprisingly, the judge did not revoke the discipline
employees received from the employer even though it was based

bargain with a union over the installation and use of surveillance cameras); Nat'l Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 F.3d 928, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding employer must provide union with
information regarding surveillance cameras in order for union to carry out its representative
obligations).
150. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. at 515.
151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
323 N.L.R.B. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979).
Nat'l Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 324 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 2003).
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560 (July 22, 2004).
Seeid. at 561.
See id. at 560 (citing Nat'l Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 324 F.3d 928 (2003)).
See id.
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exclusively on evidence obtained by hidden cameras. 164 The dissenting
judge argued that reinstatement and back pay of the employees, i.e.
make-whole relief, is the only remedy that would truly restore the status
quo, but the majority rejected this argument. 165 They reasoned that the
remedy was inconsistent with the policies behind the Act and public
policy in general because
it would "reward parties who engaged in
166
unprotected conduct.'

Although there appears to be more protection afforded union
employees, the reality is that employers violating surveillance law are
only given a slap on the wrist. As Anheuser-Busch demonstrates, the
NLRB found the company violated federal labor law, 167 but this decision
was, in essence, cold comfort to the employees who were discharged as
a result of this violation.
This decision highlights the importance of proper remedies in any
proposed future federal legislation concerning video surveillance. Not
only must justice be served and the status quo restored, but penalties
must also exist in order to provide incentives for employers to comply
with the regulations. The proposed legislation at the conclusion of this
note will serve both to punish and to deter.
IV. LACK OF STATUTORY PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL

Another potential source of employee protection is state
constitutional privacy provisions. Ten states have recognized a right to
privacy.1 68 However, only California has applied this right to private
actors.1 69 Since most state constitutions do not protect employee
privacy, employees must instead rely on state statutory provisions when
seeking a remedy. State legislatures have begun enacting laws but with
limited success.
There are three broad categories of state statutes affording
protection to employees.17 0 The first category mirrors the Wiretapping

164. Id. at 561.
165. Id. at 561, 563 (Member Walsh dissenting).
166. Id. at 561.
167. Id. at 560.
168. ALA. CONST. art. I § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I § 1; FLA. CONST. art.
I §§ 12 & 23; HAW. CONST. art. I §§ 6 & 7; ILL. CONST. art. I §§ 6 & 12; LA. CONST. art. I § 5;
MONT. CONST. art. I1§ 10; S.C. CONST. art. I § 10;WASH. CONST. art. I § 7.
169. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (1994) (holding that the California state
constitutional privacy provision "creates a right of action against private entities as well as
government entities").
170. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West Supp. 2007); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 203-c
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Act and provides only video with audio protection and no explicit
protection from video only monitoring."' The second category protects
only the most intensely private employee actions from video
surveillance.72 The third enacts only a notice requirement. 73 The first
two categories of legislation, while evidencing legislatures' recognition
of the need for increased protection, do not substantively expand
workers' rights. The third category affords more protection by
mandating notice, but still falls short. It gives employers a legal safety
net to avoid litigation simply by posting a notice of surveillance, and it
ignores employees' dignity rights.
Recently, the New York State legislature enacted a statute that
provides, "[n]o employer may cause a video recording to be made of an
employee in a restroom, locker room, or room designated by an
employer for employees to change their clothes, unless authorized by
court order."' 174 Under this new law, both private and public sector
employees are protected. 175 The statute creates a civil cause of action
that allows employees to sue their employer for176damages including
attorneys' fees and costs as well as injunctive relief.
Like New York, Rhode Island and California prohibit making an
audio or video recording of an employee in locker rooms and restrooms,
177
and other areas employers designate for employees to change clothes.
The Rhode Island statute creates a civil action and allows courts to
award damages and attorney's fees, and grant injunctive relief.1 78 These
statutes and others like it merely codify the common law;81079 they do not
make any strides towards increased employee protection. 1
(McKinney Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48b (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 705 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (LexisNexis 2002).
171.

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48b.

172. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(a). As interpreted by most courts, the most "intensely
private" areas include places like restrooms and changing room stalls.
173. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705.
174. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 203-c(l)(McKinney Supp. 2008).
175. See id. § 203-c.
176. Id.§ 20 3-c(3).
177. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.12-1(a) (Supp. 2007); CAL. LAB. CODE § 435(a) (West 2003).
178. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.12-1(c)(1)-(2).

179. Employees already have strong causes of action such as common law invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fourth amendment claims (for public actors) where
employers engage in video surveillance in a restroom or other clearly private areas.
180. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.12(a) (prohibiting video recording in locker rooms, restrooms
and other rooms designated by employer as a clothe changing room); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-320(a) (LexisNexis 2002) (providing that employers cannot use any electronic surveillance systems
in areas designated for health or comfort of employees or for safeguarding their possessions such as
restrooms, showers, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and employee lounges).
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The New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control
Act18 ' ("WESCA") and other similar state statutes, mirror the Federal
Wiretapping Act and fail to prohibit the interception of images.
Connecticut law falls into the third category of statutes, requiring
182
employers to give notice before engaging in electronic monitoring.
Employers must conspicuously post a notice concerning the types of
electronic monitoring in which they will engage. 183 "Electronic
monitoring" is broadly defined by the statute as "the collection of
information on an employer's premises concerning employees' activities
or communications by any means other than direct observation,
including the use of a computer, telephone, wire, radio, camera,
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo-optical systems. 184 Prior
written notice is not required when an employer has reasonable belief
that an employee is engaged in conduct that creates a hostile work
environment,85violates the law, or infringes on employer or employees'
legal rights. 1
In addition to the notice statute, Connecticut has enacted a first
category statute that regulates the use of electronic surveillance. 186 The
statute prohibits use of electronic surveillance in areas used for
employees' personal comfort and health, and areas used to safeguard
their possessions. 187
The statute also forbids an employer from
overhearing or recording conversations and discussions related to the
employment contract negotiations between parties.89188 Violators may be
subject to civil penalties as well as imprisonment.'
West Virginia's statute is similar to Connecticut's. The West
Virginia statute prohibits an employer from operating an electronic
surveillance system or device to record or monitor employees in areas
employees use for health or comfort, or to safeguard their possessions.'"
There is no civil cause of action, but violators may be criminally liable
for a misdemeanor offense and fined according to the number of

181. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-I to -34 (West Supp. 2007).
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1) (West 2003).
183. Id.
184. Id. § (a)(3).
185. Id. § 31-48d(b)(2).
186. Seeid. § 31-48b(b).
187. Id. Examples of such areas include restrooms, locker rooms, and lounges, Id.
188. Id. § 31-48b(d).
189. Id. § 31-48b(c), (e).
190. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(a) (LexisNexis 2002). For example restrooms, shower
rooms, dressing rooms and employee lounges. Id.
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previous offenses committed."9 '
Congress' inaction has lead to this patchwork of state laws which
grant employees limited rights at best. While each type of statute is a
positive step in the direction, none provides enough limitation on
employers' otherwise unfettered abuse of this intrusive and invasive
form of monitoring.
V. COMMON LAW PROVIDES REMEDIES IN ONLY THE MOST EGREGIOUS
CASES

In a Harvard Law Review article published in 1890, Louis Brandeis
and his law partner Samuel Warren first proposed a new tort action for
the invasion of privacy. 192 They wrote primarily to propose new
remedies for the abuses of print media. 193 Their article was influential in
convincing the states to recognize privacy-based torts. 194 The U.S.
Supreme Court later articulated that the right to privacy was "the right to
be let alone.' ' 195 However, it wasn't until 1960 that William Prosser
formulated four basic theories under which employees could file a
common law invasion of privacy tort claim against employers96 who
engage in unconsented monitoring of electronic communications.1
There are four basic common law invasion of privacy torts that
have been recognized by most jurisdictions: (1) unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another; (2) misappropriation or exploitation of a
person's name or likeness; (3) public disclosure of private facts; and (4)
depiction of a person in a false light. 197 However, these privacy torts
have yet to punish and deter unreasonable surveillance of employees in
the private workplace. In New York, for example, courts have declined
to recognize a common law right to privacy altogether. 98 The New
191.
192.
(1890).
193.

Id. § 21-3-20(b). Fines range from $500 dollars to $2,000 dollars. Id.
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196-97

194.

E. Leonard Rubin, Rights of Publicity and Entertainment Licensing, in UNDERSTANDING

Seeid. at 197.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2006, at 261, 265 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 9070, 2006).
195. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (footnote omitted).
196. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960); W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (West Group 5th ed. 1984) (1941).
197.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).

198. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating "[n]o socalled common law right of privacy exists in New York"); Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 382
N.E.2d 1145, 1146 n. 2 (N.Y. 1978) (stating "[i]n New York, there exists no so-called common-law
right to privacy").
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York Court of Appeals stated, "[w]e have in the past recognized that, in
this State, there is no common-law right of privacy and the only

available remedy is that created by Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51. ',199
Instead, some plaintiff employees attempt to bring their cases under a
defamation

theory.2 °0

However, this theory

is concerned

with

publication rather than monitoring of electronic communication.
In the employment context, the unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another tort proves most relevant because it is associated
with either: a physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has
secluded his or herself; the use of the defendant's senses, with or without

mechanical aids, (e.g., wiretaps, microphones, or just plain spying) to
oversee or overhear the plaintiffs private affairs; or some other form of
investigation or examination into the plaintiff s private concerns, such as
opening his or her private and personal mail.20 1 Unlike the other
common law causes of action, this tort is based on the psychological

distress caused by the intrusion itself and therefore it is not necessary
that the wrongdoer (i.e., employer) learn anything embarrassing or
private about the person harmed or that the employer wrongfully
disclose that information.20 2 Although this right is recognized by most

jurisdictions, courts rarely find for employees who assert employers
invaded their right to privacy through electronic monitoring.
When courts have considered claims in the workplace, they have
generally found for the plaintiffs only if the challenged intrusions
involved information or activities of a highly intimate nature. Where
the intrusions have merely involved unwanted access to data or
activities
related to the workplace, however, claims of intrusion have
20 3
failed.

199. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985). Civil Rights Law section 50
protects an employee's right to privacy if the employer uses, for advertising purpose or for trade, the
"name, portrait, or picture of any living person without having first obtained written consent of such
person." N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (MeKinney 2002). It also classifies a violation of this section
as a misdemeanor. Id. Civil Rights Law section 51 grants the employee a cause of action for
injunction and damages. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
200. An employee may bring a claim for defamation if an employer has, without an applicable
privilege, communicated something false and defamatory about an employee. If the statement is
true the employer has an absolute defense. See John B. Lewis, I Know What You E-Mailed Last
Summer, SECURITY MGM'T, Jan. 2002, (citing Lian v. Sedgwick James of N.Y., Inc., 992 F. Supp.
644,649 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
202. See id. § 652B cmt. a & cmt. b.
203. Med. Lab. Mgt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D. Or.
1998) (citing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621 (3d Cir.1992); Doe v. Kohn Nast
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This is because in a majority of jurisdictions, to succeed on an
intrusion upon seclusion claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that (1) there was an intrusion,2 °4 (2) the intrusion was intentional,2 °5 (3)
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter
intruded upon, 206 and (4) the intrusion was "highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 2 °7 Even if the employee succeeds in proving all the
elements, she may still lose if the employer had a legitimate business
reason for
the intrusion that outweighs the employee's privacy
°8
2

interest.

It is extremely difficult for an employee to succeed on an intrusion
claim in all but the most egregious circumstances. Many plaintiffs lose
because they have not carried their burden of showing an intrusion in the
first place.20 9 Courts generally find the employer's actions do not rise to
the requisite level of intrusion unless they have videotaped employees
while they were undressed. 210 Even if the employee is able to prove an
intrusion existed, she must then prove the invasion was intentional.2 1

& Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); Smith v. Col. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F.
Supp. 854, 857 (D. Colo.199 1)).
204. Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that a "necessary
element of this type of invasion of privacy is, of course, that there be an 'intrusion').
205. See Peavy v. Harman, 37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 521 (N.D. Tex. 1998), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub noa., Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant's
subjective belief as to the legality of eavesdropping with a police scanner was irrelevant to the
satisfaction of the element of intent and that "plaintiffs need only prove that the [defendants] desired
the consequences of their actions or reasonably believed that such consequences were likely to
result therefrom").
206. Med. Lab., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citations omitted) ("[A] plaintiff can
recover 'only if he had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation, or data source').
207. Id. at 1189 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)) ("[T]he intrusion
must be found to be 'highly offensive to a reasonable person').
208. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[Tihe company's
interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its email system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in those comments.").
209. See Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing The
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)) ("The intrusion prong of invasion of privacy
requires a positive act by a defendant ... that encroaches on a plaintiffs seclusion").
210. See Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1423 1427 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
security guard firm liable for invasion of privacy because the guards videotaped models while they
were changing in a dressing area at a fashion show); Speer v. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 646 N.E.2d
273, 274 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994) (monitoring of employees in area within the workplace generally
considered private, such as restroom, constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy); Harkey v.
Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that the installation of hidden viewing
devices alone constitutes an interference of privacy and that absence of proof that the devices were
utilized, though relevant to the question of damages, is not fatal to the plaintiffs case).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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While some jurisdictions have found that an unintentional intrusionone which was thought to be legitimate by the intruding party-may
destroy a cause of action for "intrusion on seclusion, ' ,2 12 others have
allowed the suit to proceed.213
The most contested issue is determining what constitutes an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. The general rule is there
is no objective reasonable expectation of privacy in public.214
Furthermore, there is no expectation of privacy in the workplace. Courts
are usually not receptive to employees' claims that their work
environments contain sufficiently private spaces where they may not be
monitored.215 Some employees have tried to overcome this rule by
proving that the employers have carved out exceptions by leading the
employees to believe that they had an expectation of privacy in certain
instances.21 6
Lastly, courts evaluate whether the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.217 Most courts interpret this as
requiring a balancing test between the employer's interests in intruding
and the employee's privacy interest.21 8 A plaintiff can recover "only if
the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or

212. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100-01 (holding that, although the employee had been told that
the e-mails could not be intercepted or used against the employee, the employee exhibited no
expectation of privacy in the message because the employee had voluntarily made an e-mail
communication to his supervisor).
213. See, e.g., Acuffv. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (C.D. I11.1999) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 29 (5th ed. 1984)) (holding

that the requisite intent was present because the employer "was on notice that examinations and/or
medical treatments were taking place" in the video-taped room and the employer "had in mind a
belief or knowledge that consequences other than catching an alleged thief were substantially
certain to result from the videotaping").
214. See Salazar v. Golden State Warriors, No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2366,
at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2000) (noting that a public place cannot be distinguished from a private
place based on the amount of traffic or light); Fayard v. Guardsmark, Inc., No. 89-0108, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14211, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 1989) (holding that the surveillance of "activities in
the public view" is not enough to support a cause of action).
215. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a "common workplace"); Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992)
(holding that where an employee was videotaped picking a lock on a desk drawer, the employee had
no reasonable expectation of privacy because it was in an "open office").
216. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101 (holding that, although the employee had been told that
the e-mails could not be intercepted or used against the employee, the employee exhibited no
expectation of privacy in the message because the employee had voluntarily made an e-mail
communication to his supervisor).
217. Johnson v. Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Ga. App. 2005).
218. See id.
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solitude in the place. ' 1 9
Another available common law cause of action is intentional
infliction of emotional distress.220 This action is also premised on
privacy. Plaintiffs may claim that the intrusion into one's privacy created
emotional distress. 221 To establish a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional or reckless
conduct, (2) which is extreme and outrageous, (3) a causal connection
between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) severe
emotional distress.

222

This cause of action's roadblock is that the

conduct must be so extreme and outrageous that it goes beyond all
"bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. 223 The surveillance of the female
restroom in Johnson was egregious enough to survive defendant's
motion for summary judgment 224 but the general surveillance in Clark
was not.225
American employees have no meaningful constitutional, common
law, or statutory protection from employers' abuse of video monitoring.
Even a restroom may not be a sanctuary protected by privacy law.226
This void in the law "accords the employer near
plenary power to govern
227
the workplace; in fact to govern the worker.,
VI. COMPARATIVE LAW:

AN

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

"Americans reflexively dismiss Europe as a clapped-out old

219. Shulman v. Group W. Prod., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
220. Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 659 (Ga. App. 2005) (employer used video surveillance in female
restroom for three years to combat suspected drug use); Clark v. Elam Sand & Gravel, Inc., 777
N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (employer used general video surveillance in the workplace
without giving notice to employee).
221. See Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 661.
222. Id.
223. Clark, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (citations omitted); Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 661.
224. Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 661.
225. Clark, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
226. Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 660. (citing In re C.P., 555 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 2001)) (no privacy in
a public restroom when restroom is used in a way other than its intended purpose).
227. Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in
Western Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 577, 577 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977) (stating that intrusion on seclusion "does not depend upon any
publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs"); see also Med. Lab. Mgmt.
Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191 (D. Ariz. 1998) (noting that "'[t]he
basis of the tort [of intrusion] is not publication or publicity. Rather the core of this tort is the
offensive prying into the private domain of another."' (quoting Russell v. ABC, No. 94C5768, 1995
U.S. Dist LEXIS 7528, 1995 WL 330920, at *21 (D. Ill. May 31, 1995))).
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continent-a wonderful place to visit but hardly the anvil of the future.
Europeans, equally reflexively, dismiss America as the embodiment of
all the evils of modernity-a testosterone-driven adolescent bereft of
history and tradition., 22 8 Part I.A. introduced the dignity concept
adopted by many foreign nations, especially in Continental Europe. 9
These countries do not idly proclaim their respect for workers; many
countries have enacted legislation to actively protect their workforce.23 °
We recognize America's sovereignty and distinct value system,
however, it is useful to examine the protections afforded citizens in
foreign countries because, in the increasingly borderless global
economy, the United States is at risk of losing its competitive edge if it
fails to harmonize with the rest of the world.2 3'
New South Wales, Australia passed the Workplace Video
Surveillance Act of 1998.232

The Act prohibits only covert video

surveillance of employees.233 Overt surveillance is not prohibited, but
the statutory definition of covert surveillance includes what could be
considered overt by laypersons.2 34 Covert surveillance may be used
when the surveillance's purpose is not to monitor employees acting in
their capacity as employees. 235 Employers may seek a Magistrate's
order to use covert surveillance with the belief that employees are
engaged in illegal activities. 6 Violations may result in criminal

228.

Old America v. New Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2003, at 32.

229. See supraSection I. A.
230. French law even extended to taping of a "Big Brother" reality television episode.
Christophe Vigneau, Information Technology and Worker's Privacy: The French Law, 23 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351, 351 n.1 (2005). Producers were required to allow participants private time
off camera. Id.; see supra note I and accompanying text (discussing reality television).
231. Cf Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers' Safety and Health, 1877-1977,
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/mono-regsafepartO6.htm (last visited July 13, 2008)
(discussing the history of worker's compensation legislation in the United States). Germany paved
the way in providing protection to its workforce by adopting a worker's compensation system in
1884. Id. While other European countries followed the lead of Germany, America continued to
force its workers to rely on existing common law actions that made it hard for worker's to prove
employer fault. Id. At first, legislators enacted statutes making it easier for employees to recover,
but the result was disastrous liabilities for employers forcing them to take out expensive liability
insurance. Id. In the early 1900's, some states such as Maryland, began enacting their own
worker's compensation systems. Id. It wasn't until 1921 that worker's compensation gained
widespread support and was adopted by forty six jurisdictions, nearly forty years after Germany first
enacted its worker's compensation laws. Id.
232. See Privacy NSW, Guide to the Workplace Video Surveillance Act at 1, 5 (Feb. 2002),
available at http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/workvideo2002.pdf.
233. Id. at 2. The act does not prohibit surveillance of independent contractors. Id.
234.

See id.

235.
236.

For example when video surveillance is used for security purposes. Id.
Id. at 3. When such an order is obtained, the employer may only use the surveillance for
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23
prosecution by the government. 23
Employees' sole remedy is to report
the violation to the police because the Act does not create a civil cause
of action.238
Canada enacted the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act of Canada23 9 ("PIPEDA"). The statute's purpose is to
regulate the collection of information regarding an "identifiable
individual., 240 The Act recognizes the expanding use of technology and
a person's right to privacy. 241 Video surveillance is not explicitly
prohibited.
In 2002, Canadian Pacific Railway employees brought a complaint
to the Canadian Privacy Commissioner under PIPEDA after the railway
installed six video cameras in its maintenance yard without giving the
employees notice. 242 The employees claimed "this system could be used
for monitoring the conduct and work 243
performance of workers and that

would be an affront to human dignity.

PIPEDA allows an organization to collect information where a
reasonable person would consider it appropriate under the
circumstances.244 The Privacy Commissioner established a four prong
test to determine whether the surveillance was reasonable: 1) does the
measure fulfill a specific need, 2) the probability the measure will be
effective in meeting the need, 3) the proportionality of the loss of
privacy to the gained benefit, and 4) the availability of a less intrusive
method to achieve the goals.245
The Commissioner found that although there were some incidents
of vandalism, the railroad had not demonstrated a "real and specific"
harm.246 He noted the lack of statistical evidence to show the cameras'
effectiveness in deterring criminals; he suggested that posted notices of

the purpose specified in the order. Id. It may not use the surveillance for general monitoring of the
employee such as to determine whether the employee is present or tardy for work. See id.
237. Id. at 4.
238. Id.
239. Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act ("PIPEDA"), 2000 S.C.,

ch. 5 (Can.).
240. See Eastmond v. Canadian Pac. Ry., [2004] F.C. 852,
241. Id. 26 (citing PIPEDA).

7 (Can.).

242. Id. 1-2 (the railroad claimed the cameras were necessary for security purposes).
243. Id. 2 (emphasis added). The complaint also alleged that a security problem did not exist,
the surveillance was done in secret without the consultation of the union, and it would adversely
affect workers' morale. Id.
244.
245.
246.

PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch. 5, div.l(5)(3) (Can.).
Eastmond, [2004] F.C. 852, 13.
Id. 14.
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surveillance may be just as effective without actually using cameras. 247
Additionally, there was no evidence the railroad tried utilizing
alternatives to video surveillance, such as better lighting.248 Finally,
regarding the loss of privacy, the Commissioner stated:
While I acknowledge that the system provides a poor picture resolution
and the cameras are not trained on areas where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, it may nevertheless be possible to identify an
individual during the day... I am concerned that the mere presence of
these video cameras has given rise to the perception among employees
that their comings and goings are being watched, whether or not that is
actually the case, and that the adverse psgchological effects of a
perceived privacy invasion may be occurring.
After weighing the factors, the Commissioner decided the
surveillance was not reasonable and violated PIPEDA °
The Canadian court adopted the Commissioner's test. 251 The court

noted that an employee does not shed his expectation of privacy simply
by entering into an employment relationship, but also acknowledged the
employer's rights regarding business and property interests.252 In further
discussing the importance of balancing the parties' interests, the court
opined that worker surveillance may contribute to a "diminution of one's
sense of personal dignity or privacy. ,253 Although the court ultimately
held that the surveillance was not unreasonable, the factors considered
by the court highlight the difference in the way American courts and
other courts view video surveillance. 4
French courts have also held that employees enjoy a right to have
the intimacy of their private life protected while in the workplace.255
Like the Canadian court, the French court balanced the employees' right
of privacy against the employer's right of control.256 The court used the
European Convention on Human Rights and the French Civil Code as

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. 15.
251. See id. 126-27.
252. Id. 159.
253. Id.
254. Compare id. 177, with Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 180-81 (1st Cir.
1997) (court only looked at employees' objective and subjective expectation of privacy, as opposed
to the reasonableness of the employer's surveillance).
255. Vigneau, supra note 230, at 355.
256. Id.
at 355-56.
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guidelines in reaching a decision. 57
The Italian legislature has specifically recognized its workforce's
dignity. As early as 1970, the legislature enacted legislation to protect
workers.25 8 Title I of the statute is entitled "The Freedom and Dignity of
the Employee.,, 259 Article 4 of the Worker's Statute addresses video
surveillance. 260 The statute's language declares that video surveillance
the act
is a direct assault on workers' human dignity. 261 Furthermore,
262
forbids any form of remote video surveillance of employees.
The European Union has also recognized the importance of
employees' privacy rights. Directive 95/46/EC protects the "fundamental
rights and freedoms of natural persons. 263 The directive applies to the
processing of personal data.264 It leaves precise implementation to the
member states and does not explicitly prohibit video surveillance. 265
However, in its recitals, the directive states that image data (e.g. video
surveillance) that is used for "public security, defence [sic], national
security" or otherwise used for State activities such as criminal
investigations are not within the scope of the directive.266 Member states
must provide judicial remedies to persons whose rights have been
breached.267
VII. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

A. FederalProposals
Since 1993, there have been three legislative proposals introduced
268
in the United States Congress addressing workplace surveillance.
None has passed and most are inadequate. Senator Simon (D-Ill.)

257. Id. at 355.
258. Claudia Faleri, Information Technology and Worker's Privacy: The Italian Law, 23
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 399, 400 (2005). The Worker's Statute, Law 300/70, imposed
restrictions on management but did not create any rights for individual employees. Id.
259. Id. at 401.

260. Id.
261.
262.

Id.
See id.

263. Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EC).
264. Id. art. 3.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. arts. 1-34.
Id. pmbl. 16.
Id. art. 22.
See infra notes 275, 285, 292.
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proposed the most comprehensive bill in 1993.269 He noted that the
United States has supported laws that protect its neighbors and
government from spying on the nation, and lack of laws protecting its
citizens from being spied on in the workplace. 270 He also suggested that
monitoring is a "de facto" form of discrimination because women are
more commonly employed in the types of jobs that are monitored.27'
The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act ("PCWA") regulates
electronic monitoring in the workplace, including video surveillance. 7v
It requires that employers give notice to employees of monitoring
practices.273 Specifically, employers must advise employees as to the
types of monitoring used, when the monitoring will occur, a description
of the monitoring, how the information collected will be used, and
whether there are any exceptions to the notice requirement.2 74
Employers must also advise potential employees during the interview
process of any electronic monitoring to be used during employment.2 75
The Secretary of Labor must provide a notice regarding employee rights
under the Act to employers, which employers must post. 276 The bill
allows employers to monitor without notice when they have a
"reasonable suspicion" that an employee is engaged in, or about to be
engaged in, misconduct that either violates criminal or civil laws,
misconduct, or will severely, adversely impact
constitutes willful gross 277
the employer's business.

The bill also regulates the amount of monitoring an employer may
engage in and establishes limitations on what the employer may do with
the information gathered.278 It provides a tiered system based on length
279
of service on the amount of random monitoring an employer may use.
The Act completely prohibits any monitoring in "private areas" defined
as bathrooms, locker rooms, and dressing rooms.28 °
While the PCWA is the most comprehensive plan, it needs
269. 139 Cong. Rec. 10,354-55 (1993) (statement of Sen. Simon).
270. Id.
271. Id. For example, clerical positions and phone operators. Id.
272. Id. at 10,355.
273. Id. at 10,356.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. Prior to commencing the monitoring, the employer must sign a written statement
declaring its compliance with the statute and describing the suspicious conduct. Id. The statement
must be kept for three years. Id.
278. Id. at 10,356-57.
279. See id. at 10,356.
280. Id. at 10,357.
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improvement. The distinctions between continuous and random
monitoring are confusing. Rules must be straightforward and easily
interpreted. The prohibition against random monitoring of employees
with more than five years of service 281 is unfair to employers.
Management must ensure their newest employees are doing work
properly, but it is also important to ensure that older employees haven't
fallen into bad habits. The list of excluded areas is a good start, but
should be expanded to break rooms and lunch rooms. Surveillance of
prohibited areas should not be left to the employer's discretion to act
when there is reasonable suspicion. If criminal behavior is suspected, the
police must be contacted to conduct a proper investigation.
The Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act ("NEMA") was
introduced by Representative Charles Canady (R-FL) and the Senate's

version was introduced by Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) in 2000.282

NEMA would have established a private right of action against
employers who failed to give notice of wire or network monitoring. 283 284
It

does not prohibit monitoring and only requires employers give notice.
There are exceptions to the notice requirement when an employer
reasonably suspects misconduct.28 5 Senior Staff Counsel, James X.
Dempsey, testified on behalf of the Center for Democracy and
Technology generally supporting NEMA. 286 However, he voiced
dealing with the use of
concern about one "oversight in the drafting"
287
hidden video cameras in the workplace:
As the bill is currently drafted, it does not cover video cameras that do
not pick up sound. Yet there have been some truly egregious cases of
employers using hidden cameras to secretly spy on their employees.
Consider the following cases from the ACLU's web site: A few years
ago, postal workers in New York City were horrified to discover that
management had installed video cameras in the restroom stalls. Female
workers at a large Northeastern department store discovered a hidden
video camera installed in an empty office space that was commonly

281. Id.
282. See H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000) (introduced by Congressman Canady); 146
CONG. REC. S15,685 (2000) (Senate version of NEMA introduced by Senator Schumer).

283. See H.R. 4908

§ 271 l(a)(1).

284. Id. § (a)-(b).

285. Id. § (c)(1)-(2).
286. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Provacy Act of 2000 and Notice
of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 5018, H.R. 4987, and H.R. 4908 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49, 50 (2000).
287. Id. at 57 (statement of James X. Dempsey).
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secretly
used as a changing room. Waiters in a large Boston hotel2 were
8

videotaped dressing and undressing in their locker room.

While this proposal is a step in the right direction, its failure to
include video surveillance is a mistake. Senator Schumer acknowledged
that electronic surveillance is destroying employees' privacy in the
workplace.289 Unfortunately, Senator Schumer did not recognize the
dignity and privacy concerns raised by video surveillance, specifically.
Congressman Thomas Petri (R-WI) introduced the Employee
Changing Room Privacy Act, in February, 2005.290 Congressman Petri
recognized several instances of inappropriate surveillance, including
Gail Nelson's case. 291 The legislation prohibits employer's audio and
video monitoring of employees in dressing rooms, restrooms, or any
other area where the employer may reasonably expect employees to
change clothes.292

The bill creates a private cause of action for

aggrieved employees.293
Additionally, the bill allows for enforcement actions led by the
Secretary of Labor against employers who violate the prohibition against
video or audio monitoring.2 94 Employers are entitled to a hearing and
the Secretary of Labor may adjust the penalty based on several factors
including the fine's effect on the employer's business and the
circumstances surrounding the violation.2 95296 The Secretary may also
obtain an injunction by bringing a civil suit.
This proposal is an encouraging development. However, Congress
has not taken any further action on the bill since its referral to the House
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections in March 2005.297 The bill
restricts monitoring of restrooms and dressing rooms, but then
incorporates the weakness of an expectation test for protection of other
areas employees may use to change. Case law has proven that the

288. Id. (statement of James X. Dempsey) (citing ACLU, Privacy in America: Electronic
2003,
Oct.
22,
ACLU,
Monitoring,

http://www.aclu.org/privacy/workplace/15646res2003022.html).
289. 146 CONG. REC. S15,632 (2000).
290. H.R. 582, 109th Cong. (2005); 151 CONG. REC. E152 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Petri).
291. Compare 151 CONG. REC. at E 153, with supra text accompanying notes 4-11.
292. H.R. 582 § 2; 151 CONG. REC. at E152.

293.

H.R. 582 § 4(a).

294.

Id. § 3(b).

295.

Id. § 3(b), (c)(1)-(2).

296. Id. § 3(h).
Congress,
H.R.
582,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgiThomas:
Library
of
297. See
bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR00582:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol25/iss2/6

32

Fiore and Weinick: Undignified in Defeat: An Analysis of the Stagnation and Demise o
20081

UNDIGNIFIEDIN DEFEAT

reasonable expectation of privacy test is not an adequate protection for
employees. Congress needs to define a clear right that employers can
rely on as opposed to limiting the extent to which employers can
monitor.
The first federal privacy-enhancing bill was proposed over a decade
ago in response to a gap in the law. 298 Unfortunately there is still no
express protection afforded to employees when it comes to video
surveillance, which is arguably the most invasive and personal of all
monitoring practices.
B. Privateproposals
Several private organizations that defend workers' rights have
recommended electronic monitoring statutes. The American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") believes that electronic surveillance,
including video surveillance, is a major threat to employees' right to
privacy and urges its members to encourage their legislators to adopt its
"Model Statute on Electronic Monitoring." 299 Their "Model Statute"
includes a notice requirement to all employees and applicants, a
restriction of monitoring of locker rooms, restrooms, and lounges, and
monitoring used for disciplinary action or performance
prohibition 3of
00
evaluations.
The ACLU's proposal is useful as a general guideline but it does
not offer specifics. It also encompasses all forms of electronic
monitoring and is not limited to video surveillance. The proposal creates
many rights for the employee and does little to protect the rights of the
employer. Additionally, the model statute does not provide any guidance
regarding remedies or enforcement.
In addition to the model statute, the ACLU proposed a "Fair
Electronic Monitoring Policy."'30 1 It includes the same essential
components of the model statute such as the notice requirement and
prohibition of monitoring of "areas designed for the health or comfort of
employees. 30 2

298. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993); 130 CONG. REC.
10,354 (1993).
299. ACLU, Through the Keyhole: Privacy in the Workplace, an Endangered Right, ACLU,
July 26, 1998, http://www.aclu.org/privacy/workplace/I5648res19980726.html.
300. Id.
301. ACLU, Privacy in America: Electronic Monitoring, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/workplace/15646res20031022.htm.

Oct.

22,

2003,

302. Id.
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In a 2004 article, the National Workrights Institute ("NWI")
proposed the "Workplace Privacy Act" ("WPA"). °3 The Act is both
comprehensive and fair in addressing all forms of monitoring except
video. The WPA generally allows workplace monitoring by employers
when it is done on the employer's premises, when it is done in the
"normal course of employment," when the employee is engaged in
activity related to the performance of his duties, or when done in the
interests of protecting the employer's property.30 4 The section does not
regulate video surveillance. Video is only regulated by section 2(e)
which prohibits video and audio monitoring in bathrooms, dressing
rooms, locker rooms, and "other areas" employees use to change
clothes. 30 5 The Act provides for an exception when the employer has
received a court order to use video.30 6
The NWI's proposal is almost a model proposal; however, it does
not adequately regulate video surveillance. With the exception of
establishing prohibitions to places in the workplace where an employer
may use video surveillance, it does not regulate video in any other way.
The proposal is vague as to whether video is permissible in other areas
of the workplace and whether an employer must provide notice of video
monitoring.
C. Our Proposal: Workplace Dignity and Security Act
Attempts to address video surveillance intrusions into privacy in the
workplace have been largely ad hoc and have produced a regulatory
maze that provides little protection to employees. New technological
advances have made video surveillance cheaper and more effective than
ever. The effects of globalization mandate that American law keep pace
with the laws of other nations. Our proposal will take into account the
strengths and weaknesses of previous attempts and incorporate both
employer and employee interests.
The Workplace Dignity and Security ACt 307 attempts to balance the
employers' needs to maintain a secure and safe workplace against the
employees' needs to work in a respectful and dignified environment.30 8

303. NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INST., PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN
THE WORKPLACE 20-22 (2004), http://www.workrights.org/issue-electronic/NWl_EM-Report.pdf.
304. Id. at 20 (§ 2(a)(1)(A)-(B) of proposed "Workplace Privacy Act" ("WPA")).
305. Id. at 21 (§ 2(e)(l) of proposed WPA).
306. Id. at 21 (§ 2(e)(l)(A) of proposed WPA).
307. Offered as an amendment to Title 29 U.S.C.
308. Cf Eastmond v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 2004 F.C. 1842 13 (Can.) (Canadian court decision
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It establishes areas that are completely protected against surveillance so
employees have a safe haven. It provides for areas of the workplace that
may be monitored with just cause and with appropriate notice to
employees. It is not the role of an employer to catch criminals; therefore,
it provides that suspected criminal activity must be reported to proper
law enforcement. It allows the Secretary of Labor to bring a criminal
proceeding and also creates a private cause of action so employees may
enforce their rights. It limits employers' liability by capping statutory
damages and by allowing employers to obtain a "Permissive Use
Permit," which would provide a safe haven against liability if its terms
are adhered to.
The Workplace Dignity and Security Act

a) Employees have a right to be free from video surveillance used by
employers in a way that does not conform to the purpose of this Act.
b) Absolute prohibitions: Employers may not use video camera
surveillance in any restroom, lunch room, break room, dressing room,
changing room, or any other area designated by an employer as an area
employees may use to undress or otherwise utilize during breaks.
c) General prohibition: Employers may not use video camera
surveillance in the workplace except for a legitimate business purpose
when there are no suitable alternatives available.
1) Employee performance is never a legitimate business purpose.
2) Suspicion of criminal activity is never a legitimate business
purpose. Prevention of criminal activity may be a legitimate
business purpose. Employers suspecting criminal activity must
contact law enforcement.
3) Where an employer uses video camera surveillance to generally
monitor a workspace, there will be a presumption against a
legitimate use. Where an employer uses video camera surveillance
utilizing four part balancing test).
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to monitor hallways and exits or entrances, there will be a
presumption in favor of legitimate use.
4) Employers approved by the Secretary of Labor for a Permissive
Use Permit may use video surveillance in accordance with the
Permit.
d) Notice: Any employer engaging in video camera surveillance in
accordance with section (b) shall post notice in a conspicuous place in
the workplace and provide all potential employees with a copy of the
notice prior to the commencement of employment.
1) Notice must provide what areas are monitored and at what
times.
2) Employers shall also post a notice of employees' rights under
the Act as provided by the Secretary of Labor.
e) Permissive Use Permit: Any employer may apply to the Department
of Labor for a Permissive Use Permit.
1) The employer will include in the application the reasons
necessary for video surveillance, the locations to be monitored, the
equipment to be used, and the times the surveillance will be used.
2) The Permissive Use Permit will allow an employer to use video
camera surveillance for the purposes stated in the application. An
employer using video surveillance in conformity with the Permit
will be immune from any civil or criminal action arising from its
use.
3) The Secretary of Labor may, in his sole discretion, issue or
deny any application for a Permissive Use Permit.
f) Enforcement:

The Secretary of Labor may bring criminal
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proceedings against any employer 30 9 who violates any section of the
Act.
1) Section (a) violations: Employers in violation of section (a) of
the act may be sentenced to 1 year in prison and may be fined up
to $25,000.
2) Section (b) violations: Employers in violation of section (b) of
the act may be fined up to $5,000.
g) Private Remedies: Employees whose rights under this section have
been violated may bring a private cause of action against their
employer.
1) Employees may recover statutory damages of no more than
$25,000 and may recover attorney's fees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States government proudly declares its support for
human rights. 3'0 Although American policy claims to be embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two are remarkably
different.3 1 Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
replete with the word dignity,3t 2 American policy is nearly devoid of
it. 31 3 In the 18th Century, when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were

309. An employer is defined as a business entity as well as individuals within the business
directly responsible for the violation.
310. See Department of State, Human Rights, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr (last visited Feb.
22, 2007) [hereinafter DOS].
311. Compare id., with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71,
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
312. UDHR, supra note 311, pmbl., arts. 1, 22, 23.
313. DOS, supra note 310. A Westlaw search for the word "dignity" in all U.S. federal
statutes returns forty results. E.g. 2 U.S.C. § 814(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2000) (establishing and
administering "Congressional Recognition for Excellence in Arts Education Awards Program"); 8
U.S.C. § 1448(d) (2000) (ensuring dignity of naturalization ceremony); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(a) (2000)
(enabling elderly persons to live with dignity); 16 U.S.C. § la-I (2000) (finding the national park
system increases national dignity). In addition, Congress has found that agriculture, courts, military
medals, the government, and the Nation's Capital all have dignity worth protecting. See 40 U.S.C.
§ 18301 (Supp. IV. 2006); 40 U.S.C. § 6734 (Supp. V. 2007); 36 U.S.C. § 40502(2) (2000); 36
U.S.C. § 20102 (2000).
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ratified, the government was viewed as the only major threat to
individual rights.31 4 The Founders did not imagine that one day,
concentrations of corporate power would exist on a scale that would
rival or exceed governmental power.
U.S. law protects important workers' rights such as minimum
wage, 31 5 safety and health, 316 benefits packages, 3 7 and leave for workers
to care for families. 31 8 It is time for Congress to protect workers'
privacy and dignity from video surveillance.
The uniformity and comprehensiveness of federal legislation is
necessary to ensure the privacy and dignity rights of America's
workingmen and workingwomen are adequately represented and
protected. We implore Congress to act on the important issue of
workplace video surveillance.
Alexandra Fiore*& Matthew Weinick**

314. ACLU,
The
Rights
of
Employees,
http://www.aclufl.org/take-action/download-resources/info..papers/12.cftm (last visited Apr. 2,
2008).
315. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, 202 (2000).
316. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000).
317. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
318. Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
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